"The only way you can win a war is to attack and keep on attacking, and after you have done that, keep attacking some more."
- General George S. Patton Jr., January 1945
The M46 was an improved M26 Pershing (sometimes named Pershing II) tank and one of the U.S army's principal main battle tanks of the Cold War, with models in service from 1949 to the mid 1950s. It was widely used by some U.S. Cold War allies, especially other NATO countries. The M46 tank was designed to replace the previous M26 Pershings and M4 Shermans.
After World War II most US Army armored units were equipped with a mix of M4 Sherman and M26 Pershing tanks.
Designed initially as a heavy tank, the M26 Pershing tank was reclassified as a medium tank postwar. The M26 was a significant improvement over the M4 Sherman in firepower and protection. Its mobility, however, was deemed unsatisfactory for a medium tank as it used the same engine that powered the much lighter M4A3. Its underpowered engine was also plagued with an unreliable transmission.
Work began in January 1948 on replacing the original power plant with the Continental AV-1790-3 engine and Allison CD-850-1 cross-drive transmission. The design was initially called M26E2, but modifications continued to accumulate, and eventually the Bureau of Ordnance decided that the tank needed its own unique designation. When the rebuild began in November 1949, the upgraded M26 received not only a new power plant and a main gun with bore evacuator, but a new designation along with a name - simply M46. In total 1,160 M26s were rebuilt: 800 to the M46, 360 to the M46A1 standard.
Pictured here is a US M46 Patton medium tank which was attached to C Company, 73rd Tank Battalion, then deployed to the Han River, South Korea, during February 1951. Now in stock!
Dimensions:
Length: 4 inches
Width: 1-1/2 inches
Release Date: February 2010
Historical Account: "Scenarios" - On December 6th, 1950, after the Chinese intervention in the Korean Conflict had forced the UN forces into a retreat from northern North Korea, General J. Lawton Collins (Army Chief of Staff), General MacArthur, Admiral C. Turner Joy and General George E. Stratemeyer, with key staff officers Hickey, Willoughby and Wright, met in Tokyo for a full discussion of what moves to take against the Chinese. They projected three hypothetical scenarios covering the next few weeks or months.
In the first, they theorized that if the Chinese continued their all-out attack but with the UN Command forbidden to mount air attacks against China, no blockade of China set up, no reinforcements sent to Korea by Chiang Kai-shek, and that there would be no substantial increase in MacArthur's U.S. forces until April 1951 when four National Guard divisions might be sent, then the atomic bomb might be used in North Korea.
Under the second scenario, the conferees assumed a situation in which the Chinese attack would continue but with an effective naval blockade of China put in effect, air reconnaissance and bombing of the Chinese mainland allowed, Chinese Nationalist forces exploited to the maximum, and the atomic bomb to be used if tactically appropriate. Given these conditions, General MacArthur said he should be directed to hold positions in Korea as far north as possible.
Under the third scenario, in which the Chinese would agree not to cross south of the 38th parallel, MacArthur felt the United Nations should accept an armistice. The conditions of the armistice should preclude movement of North Korean and Chinese forces below the parallel. North Korean guerrillas should withdraw into their own territory with the Eighth Army remaining in positions covering the Seoul-Inch'on area, while X Corps pulled back to Pusan. A United Nations commission should supervise the implementation of armistice terms.
So, while the U.S. had contemplated using the atomic bomb in Korea, Truman did not publicly threaten to use the bomb immediately after the Chinese intervention, but instead remarked about the consideration of using the bomb around 45 days later and only after UN forces were in retreat and had suffered some serious losses. MacArthur and other military leaders did not work on scenarios for using the bomb until after Truman's inadvertent remark during a press conference 6 days earlier. The decision not to use the atomic bomb also was not due to "a disinclination by the USSR and PRC to escalate" but rather due to pressure from UN allies, notably Britain, the British Commonwealth, and France, who were concerned that if the United States became involved in a war with Communist China, American commitments to NATO would, through sheer necessity, go by the board. China then might have little difficulty in persuading the Soviets to move into western Europe, and without U.S. resistance to this aggression, they could take all of Europe at little cost. |
