Gaso.Line GAS50161M French Renault AMR 35 Light Reconnaissance Tank (1:50 Scale)
"A lost battle is a battle one thinks one has lost."
- Marshal Ferdinand Foch
The Automitrailleuse de Reconnaissance 35 (AMR 35) was a French light tank used in WWII. It was not intended to reconnoitre and report as the name suggests but was a light armoured combat vehicle without a radio.
With his AMR 33 not yet being delivered to the French army, Louis Renault used two production vehicles to improve the type. In the middle of February 1934 he sent the first to the testing commission, refitted with a much more powerful engine. To his dismay the commission did not allow the whole production run to be converted to the new type; but a subsequent order of 92 for the second vehicle with its more reliable four-cylinder engine was made on 3 July 1934 . This was to have the name AMR 35. Also eight command tanks were to be produced, with a much larger superstructure but without a turret, which would be called AMR 35 ADF. Renault called these the Renault YS.
At this time however it became clear that the AMR 33 was a very unreliable tank: the suspension units were simply too weak to withstand the forces caused by driving cross-country. A complete redesign of the suspension was ordered, also to be used for the new Renault R35. Two types were considered; the first had two bogies, like the R 35. This Renault ZB was rejected, but in March 1936 twelve were ordered by China and four a few months later by the Yunan province administration. These were only delivered in 1940. The other had only one bogie per side and was accepted. The Renault factory designation was Renault ZT. Due to these delays, the first AMR 35 was only delivered on 22 April 1936. Meanwhile the Citrooen factory had tried to take over the order by developing the AMR Citrooen P 103 which had a very novel hydraulic suspension, but this project was rejected.
The AMR 35 was somewhat larger than the AMR 33, being 3.84 m long, 1.76 m wide and 1.88 m tall. It weighed 6.5 metric tons and could reach a speed of 60 km/h, making it the fastest French tank of its day. The side armor was increased from 8 to 10 mm. Its only weapon was a 7.5 mm Reibel machine gun.
Length: 4-1/2 inches
Width: 2 inches
Historical Account: "Classroom Lessons" - Neither the French nor the British anticipated such a rapid defeat in Poland, and the quick German victory, relying on a new form of mobile warfare, disturbed some generals in London and Paris. However, the Allies still expected they would be able to contain the enemy, anticipating a war reasonably like the First World War, so they believed that even without an Eastern Front the Germans could be defeated by blockade, as in the previous conflict. This feeling was more widely shared in London than in Paris, which had suffered more severely during the First World War in blood and material devastation.
The French leadership, in particular Edouard Daladier, Prime Minister of France since 1938, also respected the large gap between France's human and economic resources as compared to those of Germany.
The Supreme Commander of France's army, Maurice Gamelin, like the rest of the French government, was expecting a campaign from the Germans that in the strategic sense would mirror the First World War. The Von Schlieffen Plan, Gamelin believed, was to be repeated with a reasonably close degree of accuracy, and even though important parts of the French army in the 1930s had been designed to wage offensive warfare, it would be preferable to confront such a threat defensively, as the French military staff believed its country was not equipped militarily or economically to launch a decisive offensive initially. It would be better to wait until 1941 to fully exploit the combined allied economic superiority over Germany. To confront the expected German plan - which rested on a move into the Low Countries outflanking the fortified Maginot Line - Gamelin intended to send the best units of the French army along with the British Expeditionary Force north to halt the Germans in the area of the river Dyle east of Brussels until a decisive victory could be achieved with the support of the united British, Belgian, French and Dutch armies. The original German plan closely resembled Gamelin's expectations.
The crash in Belgium of a light plane carrying two German officers with a copy of the then-current invasion plan forced Hitler to scrap the plan and search for an original alternative. The final plan for Fall Gelb (Case Yellow) had been suggested by General Erich von Manstein, then serving as Chief of Staff to Gerd von Rundstedt, but had been initially rejected by the German General Staff. It proposed a deep penetration further south of the original route, which took advantage of the speed of the unified Panzer divisions to separate and encircle the opposing forces. It had the virtue of being unlikely (from a defensive point of view) as the Ardennes were heavily wooded and implausible as a route for a mechanized invasion. It had the considerable virtue of not having been intercepted by the Allies (for no copies were being carried about) and of being dramatic, which seems to have appealed to Hitler.
Manstein's aggressive plan was to break through the weak Allied center with overwhelming force, trap the forces to the north in a pocket, and drive on to Paris. The plan benefitted from an Allied response close to how they would have responded in the original case; namely, that a large part of French and British strength was drawn north to defend Belgium and Picardy. To help ensure this result, the German Army Group B was still expected to attack Belgium and the Netherlands in order to draw Allied forces eastward into the developing encirclement, as well as obtaining bases for a later attack on Britain.